

Kostiantyn Mizin¹

Hryhorii Skovoroda University in Pereiaslav

Ukrainian and Foreign Philology Faculty

Department of Foreign Philology, Translation and Teaching Methodology

Liudmyla Slavova

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

Educational and Scientific Institute of Philology

Theory and Practice of Translation from English Department

EMOTIONAL CONCEPTUAL PROXIMATES AS CONSTRUCTS FOR DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN CLOSE EMOTION CONCEPTS: A CASE STUDY OF *HAPPINESS AND JOY*

Abstract: The article identifies the semantic and affective parameters that distinguish between the close emotion concepts (ECs) HAPPINESS and JOY in the Anglo-Saxon culture. These parameters are identified on the basis of a corpus-based methodology, the core of which is the notion of “emotional conceptual proximates” (ECPs). The methodology was tested by (1) forming samples of the most relevant ECPs representing ECs HAPPINESS and JOY, and (2) comparison of the studied ECs in terms of their conceptual structures and two affective characteristics – valence and arousal. It has been found that the conceptual structure of EC HAPPINESS, in contrast to JOY, is represented not only by emotional meanings, but also by those which describe related states – moods and temperaments. Therefore, HAPPINESS demonstrates a certain duality in its semantic structure, as its main meanings form both the “partially emotion” concept of WELL-BEING and the EC JOY. The analysis of the data from the study samples allowed us to determine that, despite the high degree of similarity between the conceptual structures of the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY, the latter differ significantly in the hierarchy of their conceptual organisation, as the representatives of the Anglo-Saxon culture associate

¹ kostiantyn.mizin@gmail.com

HAPPINESS primarily with joy, love, and well-being, while JOY is associated with love, happiness, and pride. The conceptual structures of HAPPINESS and JOY also differ in the organisation of negative ECPs, because HAPPINESS contains more meanings that convey suffering and unhappiness, and JOY conveys pain, fear and sorrow. By comparing the average values of the valence and arousal ECPs of the concepts HAPPINESS and JOY, it was found that these ECPs demonstrate a rather significant indicator of ambivalence. At the same time, HAPPINESS is somewhat more positive and intense than JOY.

Keywords: *emotional conceptual proximities, emotion concept, joy, happiness, semantics, corpus linguistics.*

1. Introduction

The “emotional turn” at the end of the last century (Foolen, 2022:p.47) contributed to the formation the era of affectivism, in which emotions are actively studied not only in psychology (e.g., cognitive psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy), but also in a number of other sciences that study a human and his or her emotional world (e.g., cognitive science, neuroscience, and sociology). As a result of this scientific symbiosis, an entire field – affective sciences – has emerged, encompassing a dozen and a half scientific disciplines dealing with various issues of affect related to emotions.

The inclusion of linguistics in the affective sciences is explained by the fact that the latter is fundamental for the study of emotion (Soriano & Ogarkova, 2025:p.1), as the labelling of emotional experiences by emotion words or expressions is a central part of any emotion theory (Ogarkova et al., 2009:p.344). This is due to the fact that words designating emotions are key indicators of knowledge about the emotions themselves (Barrett et al., 2011). Such words can even influence the affective experiences that an individual has, rather than just naming them (Lindquist, 2017). For example, joy can be a spontaneous response to certain positive events, but to feel joy is to name and talk about this emotion, because experiencing an emotion requires a person to interpret their reaction (Hewitt, 2009:p.140).

There are numerous approaches to the study of the correlation between language and emotions, generally reduced to only two: expressive and cognitive. The proposed study operates with a cognitive construct, the *emotion concept*, whose nature is revealed within the framework of the cognitive approach. The latter is based on the assumption that the language of emotions not only reflects, but often actively directs or determines the perception, recognition, conceptualisation, categorisation and course of emotions by means of (1) forming emotional categories in infants, and (2) limiting the lexical grids of natural languages to those interpretations that

relate to various manifestations of emotions, and (3) bringing the linguistic representation of emotional experiences, their conceptualisation and categorisation closer to the emotional experiences themselves (Ogarkova et al., 2009:p.341). In this way, natural language is involved to a greater or lesser extent in cognitive processes, which makes it possible to reveal the extralinguistic through the linguistic and facilitates direct access to the conceptualisation and categorisation of emotions.

In recent decades, a certain consensus on the conceptualisation and lexicalisation of emotions has emerged, despite criticisms of the cognitive approach. This consensus is that the process of conceptualising emotions is measurably, though imperfectly, reflected in their lexicalisation (Bağ & Altarriba, 2024:p.1). This combination of the semantic and conceptual serves as a fairly objective basis for aligning the names of emotions with the concepts they denote (Russell & Barrett, 1999), i.e. ECs. It is noteworthy that the term *emotion concept* is now widespread not only in some linguistic disciplines (cognitive linguistics, cultural linguistics, and translation studies) (Kövecses, 1990, 2020; Mizin & Petrov, 2017; Ogarkova, 2013; Panasenکو, 2013; Panasenکو et al., 2023; Wierzbicka, 1992, 1999), but also in psychology, where it refers to slightly different notions (see, e.g., Niedenthal, 2008).

The recognition of ECs names as an integral part of the latter has created a methodological basis for identifying the level of universality or cultural uniqueness of emotion conceptualisations (Lindquist et al., 2014; Jackson et al., 2019), as well as the revealing of the conceptual structure of ECs as complex phenomena represented at the cognitive and linguistic levels. The fact that languages differ in the ways they lexicalise even basic emotions (Ogarkova, 2021; Ogarkova et al., 2013) suggests that culture-specific meanings contain both “culture-dependent” (derived from basic) and “culture-independent” (basic) emotions. The clearly expressed cultural labelling of ECs allows them to be considered as cultural concepts (Kollareth et al., 2018; Mizin et al., 2019; Ogarkova, 2013; Soriano, 2015; Wilson & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2019).

In the field of cognitive linguistics, the verbal objectification of ECs as cultural concepts is studied mainly by working out their metaphorical conceptualisation, which is based on embodiment as a “bodily basis” (Kövecses, 2020), or by using the natural semantic metalanguage methodology (Wierzbicka, 1999). However, in the field of translation studies and intercultural communication, there is an increasing number of works devoted to the search for cross-cultural equivalents of ECs (Dewaele, 2022; Mizin et al., 2021; Soriano & Ogarkova, 2025), which is largely due to today’s globalisation processes that stimulate language contacts and remove cultural barriers. Intercultural communication can only be successful if there is an

adequate cross-cultural transfer of ECs, otherwise, the target culture's speakers will get a false idea of the emotional world of the source culture's representatives. This poses a significant challenge because an individual's ability to perceive (interpret, decode) emotions is vital, as it affects their ability to understand and respond to the feelings of others (Fugate et al., 2018). Therefore, a misperception of a particular EC can lead to a misunderstanding of the emotional experiences of the speakers of a foreign culture, causing inadequate reactions to these experiences. In fact, this problem is relevant not only for communication between cultures, but also within one culture, since the names of emotions largely determine the reactions of individuals to the emotional experiences of other group members, which in turn affects interpersonal relationships (Trampe et al., 2015).

Recently, the field of emotion psychology (Bağ & Altarriba, 2024:p.2) has also addressed the problem of conceptualising emotions and encoding them in language. Here, we explore various aspects that are mainly related to the main affective dimensions on which the conceptualisation of emotions is based – valence (pleasantness), arousal (intensity) and dominance (control) (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974), or with their parameters such as concreteness (“abstract” to “concrete”), imageability (“easy” to “hard” to imagine) and context availability (“easy” to “hard” to place in a context) (Altarriba et al., 1999; Bağ, 2022).

The interdisciplinarity of modern science (Kapranov, 2025) expands the methodological boundaries of ECs analysis, complementing the scientific procedures of linguistics with psychological ones, and vice versa. In addition, the methodology of linguistics itself is evolving, which, for example, has led to the fact that the lexical approach to the study of the metaphorical conceptualisation of ECs (Kövecses, 1990) has been replaced by a corpus-based approach (Stefanowitsch, 2004). The rapid progress of the latter can be explained by the constant improvement of digital and methodological processing of language material in corpora. This has led to an increase in the objectivity of the frequency of occurrent forms. It can be assumed that the interpretation of these representative corpora can, to a certain extent, replace the definitional, contextual and associative analysis of linguistic units. This is especially true when distinguishing between similar lexemes, since this requires first, identifying all the semantic characteristics of these lexemes (definition and context analyses), and secondly, establishing the closest associations that arise in the minds of speakers of the given culture in connection with the concepts denoted by these lexemes (associative dictionaries, free associative experiment, etc.) (Mizin & Slavova, 2023). Therefore, the proposed article tests namely the corpus-based methodology.

2. Theoretical Background of the Study

2.1. EC as a complex, diffuse, and culturally marked cognitive construct

Both main approaches to the study of the nature of emotions – “natural-kinds” (P. Ekman, C. Izard, J. Panksepp, I. Roseman, S. Tomkins) and “psychological constructionist” (L. Barrett, K. Lindquist, G. Mandler, J. Russell, S. Schacter, J. Singer) – recognise their complex (multicomponent) and at the same time diffuse structure, as they include cognitive evaluations, feelings, physical symptoms and behavioural dispositions (Frijda, 2008). Therefore, any emotion, whether basic or non-basic (derived), is closely intertwined with the dynamic emotional world of a person through various connections. The configuration of the latter, unique to each emotion, is the result of the formation of this emotion on the basis of a set of features that define it. For each emotion, this set includes both the features that are common (basic) to all emotions and the features that are characteristic of that particular emotion. In view of the complex nature of emotions, researchers have different ideas (constructs, models) about their structure and systemic connections.

Researchers mostly find categorical (see, e.g., Saarimäki et al., 2022) and less often cluster (see, e.g., Goldman, 2017) organisation in the multiple hierarchies of emotion features. In both cases, the prototypical structuring of features is seen when the characteristics that reveals the most prototypical features of the emotion is in the centre and less prototypical features are in the periphery. This means that the latter can be used to model any emotion as a system whose elements have a prototypical structure, i.e. those elements that display more prototypical features occupy central positions, and those that demonstrate less prototypical features are peripheral. Without further philosophical reflection on the distinction between the notions of “category” and “cluster”, and recognising that “category” is a broader notion than “cluster”, we can assume that the features that make up a particular emotional category can be grouped within the latter in the form of clusters.

However, such a “prototype-cluster-category” understanding of the nature of emotions is too pretentious from the point of view of methodology, since the structuring of the objective world on the principle of “system within system” makes it possible to structure “category within category” or “cluster within cluster”. From this point of view, it seems logical that a smaller structural unit within a category is simply a subcategory, not a cluster. Depending on their approach to studying emotions, researchers use the notion of “emotional category” or “emotional cluster”.

Since the features, the combination of which defines a particular emotion, usually hide the emotional experiences represented by these features, the statement that an emotional category/emotional cluster is a set of prototypically structured features can be interpreted as follows: the notions of “emotional category”/“emotional cluster” cover a range of emotions, the hierarchy of which is built on the basis of a certain categorical (basic) feature. For example, joy as a basic emotion forms a fused emotional category/branched emotional cluster, the centre of which is represented by the basic emotion of joy itself and those emotions that contain the most features of the basic emotion (e.g., gladness, pleasure, happiness, satisfaction), and then, on the periphery, there are those emotions that have less common features with the basic emotion (e.g., excitement, enthusiasm, contentment). Peripheral emotions can differ from basic joy in one or more characteristics, e.g., in arousal only (cf. Plutchik, 1997) or in arousal and also in valence.

This idea is methodologically important for our study, in which we do not use the notions of “emotional category” or “emotional cluster”. As mentioned above, our methodology is based on a cognitive construct such as the ECs and its content elements, *emotional conceptual proximates*, which will be discussed in the next section of the paper. First of all, it is important to note that the *emotion concept* is widely used both in psychology (see, e.g., Niedenthal, 2008) and in cognitive and culturally oriented areas of linguistics (e.g., cognitive linguistics, cultural linguistics, anthropological linguistics). Therefore, the notion of “emotion concept” can have different meanings. Our understanding of such a concept is generated by the ideas of followers of cognitive linguistics, proposed at the end of the last century (Kövecses, 1990; Wierzbicka, 1992).

In this regard, it should be noted that the current interpretations of the notion of “emotion concept” in both psychology and linguistics are based methodologically on the notion of “concept”, which was crystallised in the cognitive sciences in the mid-twentieth century. Since then, the active study of concepts has been driven by the fact that they are considered to be mental constructs that are involved in most acts of cognition, including high-level processes (thinking, reasoning, language use) and lower-level processes (perception, attention, recognition). Such concepts are mental representations of categories of objects (natural and artefactual), situations, experiences, and actions (Niedenthal, 2008:p.583), including emotions. Therefore, a person’s emotional world can be represented as a complex conceptual system, with ECs as its “building blocks”.

As cognitive constructs, ECs are involved in the process of conceptualising and categorising an individual’s emotional experience, correlating on this basis with emo-

tional categories and emotional clusters. The complex nature of emotions has led to a complex structure of ECs and their extensive conceptual connections, so in this respect they are somewhat similar to both categories and clusters. Without going into deep scientific debates, it can be assumed to some extent that what concepts, categories and clusters have in common is that they can act as mental representations of emotions, serving to model or schematise the dynamic organisation of emotional experiences in the process of interaction between individuals (cf. the interpretation of the EC by Kövecses (2008a) as a set of cognitive models with one or more prototypical models at the centre). In this case, an emotional category can include both ECs and emotional clusters. In this regard, the choice of a particular construct for studying emotions may be related not only to a particular scientific approach, but also to the fact that, e.g., the term *emotional cluster* itself “embeds” an understanding of emotion as a complexly organised phenomenon (cf. FEAR, LOVE, PRIDE: Wilson & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2019).

On the basis of the methodological foundations outlined above, we have formed our understanding of ECs as cognitive constructs, the extensive conceptual structure of which is a complex hierarchy of emotional and cultural meanings, objectified, as a rule, with the help of linguistic units. It is through these meanings that the ECs are linked to other cultural concepts, primarily emotional ones, on the basis of the “centre-periphery” principle. This interpretation of ECs is consistent with the classical view of their nature, according to which the conceptual features (meanings) of any EC form a hierarchy of “class-inclusion”, i.e. an emotion that includes, e.g., anger, also includes irritation, rage and other subcategories of anger (Kövecses, 1990). Therefore, ECs exhibit a prototypical structure in which the most representative concept is located in the middle, and a number of related concepts surrounding it and overlapping with it to varying degrees are located on the periphery (Cowen et al., 2019). Such extensive and hierarchically structured conceptual connections of ECs contribute to their fuzzy nature (Russell & Fehr, 1994), as a result of which they are influenced by culture (Wilson & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2019:p.92).

Just as emotions are divided into basic and derived emotions, so respectively, ECs can be basic or derived. Since basic ECs are more relevant to human existence, their names generally have a higher frequency. Presumably, individuals match the prototypical response patterns they experience with available linguistic labels. On this basis, it can be assumed that the underlying affective programmes and frequently used labels are closely correlated (Ogarkova et al., 2009:p.344). The frequency of emotion names can thus be a criterion for differentiating between basic and derived ECs, because even if psychologists clearly identify a certain emotional experience in a person’s emotional mosaic on the basis of scientific criteria, it may be called

by different words in the naïve perception of the speakers of the respective culture. In this case, when it is necessary to choose the most accurate word among similar words to describe a particular emotion, the frequency criterion can be helpful.

This extends even to the names of basic emotions, about which there seems to be no uncertainty. In English, e.g., the names of the basic emotions are more or less well established, which is obviously due to the fact that the theory of basic emotions itself was developed primarily by English-speaking researchers. In other languages, however, there is a certain chaos, which is clearly illustrated by translations of the well-known emotion model by Plutchik (1997), in which the basic emotions are referred to by different terms, for example, *anger* is rendered in German as *Ärger* or *Groll* (Hildebrand, 2014:p.7). This means that finding the exact name for a particular emotional experience is sometimes quite problematic, not only for naïve native speakers, but also for psychologists themselves. It can be assumed that the difficulties in correlating a given EC with the corresponding linguistic term are mainly due to the diffuse nature of the former.

2.2. The concept of “emotional conceptual proximates”

The aforesaid suggests that the conceptual structure of any EC is hierarchically organised and dynamic, being a “cocktail” of various meanings objectified at the level of language. These meanings indicate the connections of EC with other cultural concepts – emotion, moral and ethical, socio-cultural, and ethno-cultural. Each EC is usually dominated by emotional meanings, which in turn are representations of the ECs that are closely related to it. Therefore, it is possible to identify the emotion concepts closest to it in the EC conceptual structure, which are called *emotional conceptual proximates* (Mizin & Slavova, 2023:p.4; cf. also Oster, 2012:p.338). By the latter, we mean those ECs that have the closest links (associations) with the EC whose conceptual structure is being studied. At the same time, each EC has its own hierarchical configuration of ECPs, identifying which provides a clear picture of the content of that EC as a whole.

The methodological basis for identifying ECPs is the fact that each cultural concept is the result of the interaction of other cultural concepts in the process of permanent interaction of individuals within a particular culture. As a result of this interaction, one concept leaves an imprint in the other – the basic meaning that is representative of the first concept. This semantic imprint serves as a conceptual link between two concepts, so the conceptual structure of any cultural concept is a systematically organised hierarchy of a set of such semantic imprints,

the highlighting (dominant position) and obscuring (marginal position) of which depends on their proximity or distance from the main meaning of this concept. At the same time, the closest meanings largely determine the content of the concept as a whole. Since a cultural concept is a dynamic construct, the configuration of meanings in its conceptual structure is constantly changing. The highlighting and obscuring of meanings creates the effect of conceptual approximation, when a particular conceptual connection can bring two concepts so close that they become interchangeable in certain situations.

The procedure for identifying ECPs is based on corpus data, namely the frequency of the lemmas that objectify these ECPs. We are talking about lemmas that serve as occurments (collocates and co-occurrences) of query words, which are the names of the ECs whose semantic structure is being studied. In representative corpora, lists of occurments are generated automatically by entering the corresponding query word, but to get an adequate idea of a particular EC, only those lemmas that objectify emotions and the concepts behind them, i.e. ECPs, are sampled manually. Identification of the most relevant ECPs in the conceptual structure of ECs allows us (1) to identify rather imperceptible similarities and differences in the content of ECs when determining cross-cultural equivalence or (2) to identify the meanings on the basis of which similar ECs within the same culture are distinguished.

The aforesaid suggests that the semantic structure of each EC can be represented in the form of a list of ECPs (see, e.g., Table 1), which clearly illustrates the hierarchy of negative, positive or ambivalent meanings of this EC. At the same time, the content of an EC is mostly determined by the two or three most relevant (first in the list) ECPs, which are usually interchangeable with this EC in numerous situations or completely opposite to it. The frequency of those lemmas that objectify the first ECPs in the list differs significantly from the frequency of other ECPs in the list. This means that in the naïve perception of speakers of a culture, the associations associated with a particular EC are those that represent its most relevant ECPs. Such associations can be defined as stable.

3. Methods and language corpora

Modern corpora offer a wide range of empirical material for automatic or manual processing. Thus, corpus data can serve as a fairly reliable basis for revealing the nature of a particular emotion by studying the conceptual structure of the corresponding EC. This allows alternative data to be obtained, for example, on the main affective characteristics of a particular emotion both within and across cultures.

A separate niche here could be occupied by studies dealing with the distinction between content-similar ECs, since in the naive perception of native speakers the latter are often confused, which poses an even greater problem for representatives of “other” cultures. In such cases, corpus data can contribute to an adequate understanding of individuals’ conceptual structure of ECs as well as their affective characteristics.

The aim of this article is to identify the semantic and affective parameters that distinguish the close ECs HAPPINESS and JOY in Anglo-Saxon culture, based on a corpus-based methodology whose core is the notion of “emotional conceptual proximates”.

The tested methodology is based on the following steps:

1. 1. Formation of samples of the most relevant ECPs representing the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY.
2. 2. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of these ECPs in order to compare the studied ECs in terms of (a) their conceptual structures and (b) two affective characteristics – valence and arousal. Valence and arousal indicators of ECs HAPPINESS and JOY are established on the basis of the data presented in Bradley and Lang (1999).

ECPs are manually selected based on data providing lists of occurrent forms of the query words *happiness* and *joy*. These lists are created automatically using the Collocates feature in the English-language Word Web Corpus (iWeb). As ECs are generally nouns, the ECPs were selected from the 100 most frequent collocates in the +NOUN position for each query item.

The iWeb corpus, created by M. Davies, contains 14 billion words from 22 million web pages. It is part of the English-Corpora.org collection, one of the most widely used resources for English, offering extensive insights into language variation. Unlike other large web-based corpora, iWeb is based on a systematically selected set of nearly 95,000 websites, each containing on average 240 web pages and approximately 145,000 words.

This corpus includes news articles, blogs, opinion pieces, but its primary strength lies in its massive scale and site-based structure. It lacks a systematic genre-based classification of the material; however, this limitation is not essential for the present study, as the primary emphasis is placed on its size, since a larger corpus ensures greater representativeness of the data.

4. Results and discussion

The sample size is 20 lemmas (only those denoting emotions), selected on the basis of the highest frequency (Table 1). In our opinion, this amount of data is quite sufficient to have a fairly complete picture of the semantic organisation of the ECs under comparison. The reason for this is that it is methodologically inappropriate to search for all lemmas that denote emotions without exception in work that is dedicated to the differentiation of close ECs or the identification of cross-cultural equivalents of ECs, since lemmas with low frequency rates are irrelevant for such studies.

Table 1.
The most relevant ECPs² of the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY.

Source: Own processing

N	HAPPINESS		JOY	
	ECPs	F./pmw	ECPs	F./pmw
1	JOY	0.58	LOVE	0.70
2	LOVE	0.47	HAPPINESS	0.57
3	WELL-BEING	0.22	PRIDE	0.47
4	SATISFACTION	0.15	SORROW	0.32
5	SADNESS	0.12	PAIN	0.20
6	PLEASURE	0.11	EXCITEMENT	0.19
7	CONTENTMENT	0.09	HOPE	0.18
8	HOPE	0.07	PLEASURE	0.17
9	EXCITEMENT	0.06	SADNESS	0.13
10	MISERY	0.06	SATISFACTION	0.11
11	DESIRE	0.06	FUN	0.10
12	SORROW	0.04	PASSION	0.10
13	SUFFERING	0.04	DELIGHT	0.09
14	GRATITUDE	0.04	FEAR	0.09
15	UNHAPPINESS	0.03	GRIEF	0.08
16	BLISS	0.03	RELIEF	0.07
17	ENJOYMENT	0.03	GLADNESS	0.07
18	RELIEF	0.03	BLESSING	0.06

²Frequency indicators are presented per 1 million words (pmw).

19	PRIDE	0.03	ENTHUSIASM	0.06
20	BLESSING	0.02	CONTENTMENT	0.05

The frequency indices of the ECPs (Table 1) showed that the most relevant ECP for EC HAPPINESS is JOY, and one of the most relevant (second position) ECP for EC JOY is HAPPINESS, i.e. the compared ECs are not only very close, but can be interchanged in many situations, which is also confirmed by the definitions of their names in explanatory dictionaries, cf. *joy* – ‘great happiness; a person or thing that causes happiness’; *happiness* – ‘the feeling of being happy’ (CD). Such a close overlap between the semantic elements of the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY has meant that, in the naïve view of Anglo-Saxon culture, it may be difficult to define precisely the emotional experience they feel – happiness or joy. However, not only in the naïve picture of the world, but also in scientific works, there is ambiguity in this regard.

The most obvious reason for the problematic distinction between HAPPINESS and JOY is the lack of consensus among researchers, including psychologists, on the nature of the emotions of happiness and joy (see, e.g., Emmons, 2020; Van Cappellen, 2020). This uncertainty is clearly evident at the level of language, as the lexeme happiness is not only used as a synonym for joy, but is often replaced by the compound well-being (cf. the high frequency of ECP WELL-BEING in our sample). This suggests that HAPPINESS is not only close to the ECs JOY and WELL-BEING, but also blends with them at certain points, which gives researchers grounds to consider either JOY as a part of HAPPINESS (Kövecses, 2008b) or HAPPINESS itself as a part of WELL-BEING (see more discussion on the distinction between HAPPINESS and WELL-BEING: Kneer & Haybron, 2024).

The difficulties in defining EC HAPPINESS are probably related to the fact that it contains the meanings of at least three positive states: (1) ‘endorsement’, which includes joy and sadness (transitory emotions, therefore the least important), (2) ‘engagement’, which is based on energy and motivation (not emotions, but mental states or behaviours), and (3) ‘attunement’, which is understood as mainly calmness, emotional balance (Haybron, 2013). Therefore, unlike the emotion of happiness, which includes all the elements of emotions in their prototypical manifestations, the conceptual structure of EC HAPPINESS is represented not only by emotional meanings, but also by those representing related states – moods and temperaments, when, e.g., a person with a happy temperament often tends to feel happy or to be in a good mood (Goldman, 2017:p.7).

Based on this, we can assume that the EC HAPPINESS demonstrates a duality of its semantic structure, since its main meanings form, on the one hand, the “par-

tially emotional” concept WELL-BEING (one of the types of well-being is emotional well-being (feeling, state), therefore the corresponding ECP is included in our sample) and, on the other hand, emotional JOY. The close link between HAPPINESS and WELL-BEING is based on the fact that a happy individual is defined primarily by the extent to which he or she feels content, emotionally and physically healthy, engaged in life, and believes that his or her life is meaningful (Allen, 2018:p.11). In psychology, happiness is usually measured by the indicator of subjective well-being, which is defined by frequent positive affect (predominance of pleasant emotions and moods), high life satisfaction and infrequent negative affect (predominance of unpleasant emotions and moods) (Diener et al., 2009).

Joy is largely generated by some individual success (luck). This activates pleasure, pride, enthusiasm, delight and similar meanings of EC JOY. It is success that serves as the basis for bringing the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY together. This is also confirmed by the etymology of the name EC HAPPINESS, which is associated with success (Györi, 1998:p.106–116). Since success is usually subjective, this has even led to the conclusion that the main difference between HAPPINESS and JOY is the personal nature of the former and the indefinite, possibly impersonal nature of the latter (Wierzbicka, 1992:p.566).

The correlation between happiness and success as a reward is confirmed at the level of human physiology, as it is generated by external sources of pleasure that activate the brain’s reward system associated with dopamine. Joy, in turn, is generated not only by success but also by a person’s intrinsic motivation. In other words, it correlates with the parts of the brain responsible for emotional regulation. This is consistent with the conclusion of cognitive linguists that there is a tendency to use the word *happiness* to denote value rather than emotion, whereas *joy* refers purely to emotion. At the same time, joy is a form of happiness that arises as an immediate response to a desired outcome (Kövecses, 2008b:p.138).

There is also no consensus among researchers as to which emotional experience – happiness or joy – is long-lasting and which is momentary. For example, some psychologists believe that a person can be set up for a long-term feeling of happiness (Goldman, 2017), because happiness requires a conscious assessment of one’s life as a whole. The emotion represented by EC HAPPINESS is a combination of (1) life satisfaction, (2) resources to cope with difficulties, and (3) positive emotions. It therefore determines desired life outcomes in many areas and, like other positive emotions, helps people build long-term resources (Cohn et al., 2009). At the same time, joy is a short, momentary version of happiness, so joy is a momentary emotion triggered by a generally positive assessment of our circumstances (Van Cappellen,

2020). However, other scholars take the opposite view, arguing that happiness is an emotional state that can arise from momentary experiences and is often dependent on external factors such as achievement or material satisfaction. Happiness often happens spontaneously, in a moment created by the coincidence of time and place. For this reason, happiness is temporary and ephemeral, whereas joy is more enduring because it is generated by sustained internal and external relationships that create a sense of satisfaction (Cohn et al., 2009).

It can be assumed that the characteristics of HAPPINESS as a value (instantaneous/durable) and JOY as an intense emotion (instantaneous/durable) may to some extent correlate with the prevalence (frequency) of these ECs in Anglo-Saxon culture. It can be assumed that the prevalence (frequency) of these ECs in Anglo-Saxon culture correlates to some extent with the characteristics of HAPPINESS as a value (instantaneous/lasting) and JOY as an intense emotion (instantaneous/lasting). Thus, the study of the data of our samples revealed (Table 1) that EC JOY is more relevant for today's Anglo-Saxon culture than HAPPINESS, as indicated by the frequency of both the corresponding query words ($F(\text{joy})=467871$; $F(\text{happiness})=296104$) and the number of ECPs with a relevant frequency index ($F \geq 0.1$): EC JOY has 12 such ECPs, while HAPPINESS has only 5.

Our results somewhat contradict the conclusion drawn by Wierzbicka (1992:p.566), who states that the frequency of the lexeme *joy* is low. The researcher explains the irrelevance of the latter by the intensity of the emotional experience signified by *joy*, which probably conflicts with the dominant attitudes of Anglo-Saxon culture, which prefers muted and controlled emotions. This discrepancy between the current data of the iWeb corpus and Wierzbicka's conclusion is obviously related to the dynamics of the Anglo-Saxon emotional world, which has undergone certain changes over the last thirty years. In this regard, it should also be noted that psychologists have found that joy is the emotion that people experience most often (Trampe et al., 2015), which is consistent with our findings. However, their data was collected from respondents in countries that consistently rank among the world's happiest – France and Belgium.

In general, the analysis of the data presented in Table 1 confirmed the significant closeness of the HAPPINESS and JOY ECs in Anglo-Saxon culture, as 36 out of 40 of their ECPs demonstrate full or partial equivalence, i.e. the similarity of the conceptual structures of these ECs is 85 %. At the same time, the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY differ significantly in the hierarchy of their conceptual organisation against the background of such a high similarity index. For example, for the Anglo-Saxon culture, EC HAPPINESS is associated primarily with joy, love and well-being (see the

first three positions of the ECPs list), while JOY is associated with love, happiness and pride. This correlates quite clearly with the above conclusions of psychologists (1) about the dual nature of the emotion of happiness, which is based on the close intersection of the elements of joy and (emotional) well-being in the structure of the latter, and (2) that the element of success, which in our case is represented by ECP PRIDE, is important for the emotion of joy. It should also be emphasised here that the conceptual structures of the studied ECs differ not only on the basis of different hierarchical organisation of positive ECPs, but also those expressing negative emotions: relevant for the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY is their association with sadness and sorrow (ECPs SADNESS, SORROW), but HAPPINESS contains more meanings that convey suffering and unhappiness (ECPs MISERY, SUFFERING, UNHAPPINESS), and JOY – pain, fear and grief (ECPs PAIN, FEAR, GRIEF).

As noted in the previous sections of this study, the quantitative and qualitative processing of the ECPs allows us to compare the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY not only in terms of their conceptual structures, but also in terms of such affective parameters as valence, arousal and dominance. The importance of comparing the ECs according to these parameters is explained by the fact that these elements of the content of the emotions are the primary processes of affect and form the basis of the emotional experience (Russell, 2003). The idea of distinguishing these elements is based on the notions of “evaluation”, “activity” and “potency” by Osgood and his followers (Osgood et al., 1975). This idea was developed by constructivists (see, e.g., Russell, 1989:p.300–301), who proposed the notions of “pleasure (positivity)”, “arousal (activation)”, and “control (dominance)”. Subsequently, these concepts “methodologically evolved” into the affective dimensions of emotion conceptualisation – valence (pleasantness), arousal (intensity) and dominance (control) (see, e.g., Bąk, 2022; Bash, 2024), of which valence and arousal are particularly important, according to a number of researchers (see the circumplex model of affect: Russell, 1980). Therefore, the comparison of the conceptual structures of the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY is made on the basis of these two parameters (Table 2).

Based on the 9-point scale (Bradley & Lang, 1999) used to measure the valence and arousal of the ECPs, the “average” indicator “4.5” shows a certain “neutrality” of the emotion represented by the corresponding ECP in relation to these two characteristics. Therefore, indicators below 4.5 show a negative valence and low arousal of emotions (increasing negativity and decreasing arousal from 4.5 to 0), and indicators above 4.5 indicate a positive valence and high arousal (increasing positivity and arousal from 4.5 to 9).

Table 2.
Mean value of indicators of valence (V.) and arousal (A.) of the most relevant ECPs of the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY.

Source: Own processing

N	HAPPINESS			JOY		
	ECPs	V.	A.	ECPs	V.	A.
1	JOY	8.62	6.73	LOVE	8.72	6.44
2	LOVE	8.72	6.44	HAPPINESS	8.25	7.00
3	WELL-BEING	8.29	6.11	PRIDE	7.00	5.83
4	SATISFACTION	8.00	4.44	SORROW	1.65	4.81
5	SADNESS	1.61	4.13	PAIN	2.13	6.50
6	PLEASURE	8.00	6.20	EXCITEMENT	7.50	7.67
7	CONTENTMENT	8.00	4.44	HOPE	7.05	5.44
8	HOPE	7.05	5.44	PLEASURE	8.00	6.20
9	EXCITEMENT	7.50	7.67	SADNESS	1.61	4.13
10	MISERY	2.30	4.95	SATISFACTION	8.00	4.44
11	DESIRE	7.69	7.35	FUN	8.37	7.22
12	SORROW	1.65	4.81	PASSION	8.02	7.26
13	SUFFERING	2.00	6.42	DELIGHT	8.62	5.44
14	GRATITUDE	7.66	5.90	FEAR	2.76	6.96
15	unhappiness	1.57	4.18	GRIEF	1.65	4.78
16	BLISS	7.17	5.06	RELIEF	7.61	3.74
17	ENJOYMENT	7.80	5.20	GLADNESS	8.62	6.73
18	RELIEF	7.61	3.93	BLESSING	8.25	7.00
19	PRIDE	7.00	5.83	ENTHUSIASM	8.03	7.19
20	BLESSING	8.25	7.00	CONTENTMENT	8.00	4.44
\bar{x}		6.32	5.61		6.49	5.96

The second EC is more positive (only a small difference) and slightly more intense than the first, as shown by the mean values of the valence and arousal of ECs HAPPINESS and JOY (Table 2). These findings correlate with the conclusions of both psychologists and linguists that joy is a positive and at the same time energetic (intense) emotion (Goddard, 1998; Tissari, 2008; van Cappellen, 2020). In particular, Goddard (1998:p.94) found that the lexeme *joy* conveys a more intense

semantics than *happiness*. This idea has been confirmed by Tissari (2008:p.170), who, based on the study of the metaphorical conceptualisation of HAPPINESS and JOY, found that there is a difference in the expression of intensity between these ECs, as HAPPINESS is a kind of norm, while JOY is often associated with something unusual, which can even be negative. Simultaneously, unlike HAPPINESS, JOY evokes more physiological effects and behavioural responses in individuals, conveying primarily emotional meanings. Tsai (2007) takes a slightly different view on this issue, suggesting that the view of joy as a positive emotion that causes high arousal is probably a product of American culture, which values high arousal positive emotions more than low arousal positive emotions (e.g., calm).

It should be noted that an important result obtained by developing the methodology of the proposed study is a clear illustration of the fact that positive ECs are often determined by negative ones and vice versa. Therefore, even among ECPs that represent exclusively positive (from a naive perspective) ECs, there will always be a certain proportion of negative ECPs. The data from our samples suggest that this proportion is the same for both HAPPINESS and JOY – 25 %. This is quite a significant figure. Such ambivalence in the conceptual structure of these ECs could even be a marker of their cultural specificity. For example, the positive EC JOY reveals a negative interpretation more often in British narratives than its equivalent FREUDE in German (Fronhofer, 2019:p. 245).

The reason why positive ECs can be represented by negative ECPs is that judgments about the affective quality of the opposite valence can occur simultaneously (in parallel), since the stimulus situation has many dimensions. An affective response may involve an emotional meta-experience, which may, although rarely, involve simultaneous emotional categories of opposite valence (Russell, 2017), which serves as the basis for the formation of ECs ambivalence. The latter plays an important role in harmonising an individual's emotional world by seeking emotional balance in the form of emotional release or emotional equilibrium. To a large extent, we are talking about a hidden ambivalence, when the negative semantic structure of a certain EC can be levelled by the positive meanings present in it, and vice versa. Implicit ambivalence should be distinguished from explicit ambivalence, where the “duality” of the assessment is traced in the name of the ECs (see more on implicit and explicit ambivalence: Bamberg et al., 1995; Lomas, 2023).

Based on the frequency of negative ECPs (Table 1), we can identify those ECPs that are opposite to HAPPINESS and JOY on the positive-negative axis. For the former, such an EC is SADNESS, and for the latter it is SORROW. In general, it can be assumed that in Anglo-Saxon culture an individual feels happy when he

or she is relieved of suffering (ECPs MISERY, SUFFERING), while joy arises when he or she is free from pain and fear (ECPs PAIN, FEAR). It is noteworthy that in other cultures, such as German, the ambivalent nature of happiness and joy can produce such emotional “chimeras” as the ECPs SCHADENFREUDE ‘malicious joy’ or GLÜCKSCHMERZ ‘happiness pain’ (Thomas, 2021), in which positive emotions activate negative ones: the former conveys the meaning of pleasure in one’s pain, and the latter conveys pain in one’s pleasure.

5. Conclusions

The article develops a corpus-based methodology, the core notion of which is “emotional conceptual proximates”. This notion represents those ECs that have the closest connections (associations) with a particular EC. The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the proximates made it possible to achieve the goal of the study, which was to identify the semantic and affective parameters that distinguish the close ECs of HAPPINESS and JOY in Anglo-Saxon culture. The methodology was tested by (1) forming samples of the most relevant ECPs representing ECs HAPPINESS and JOY, and (2) comparing the studied ECs in terms of their conceptual structures and affective characteristics (valence and arousal).

It is established that the semantic structure of the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY can be represented in the form of a list of ECPs, which clearly illustrates the hierarchy of their negative, positive and ambivalent meanings. The study of these hierarchies revealed that the conceptual structure of EC HAPPINESS, unlike JOY, is represented not only by emotional meanings, but also by those representing related states, such as moods and temperaments. Therefore, the EC HAPPINESS demonstrates a certain duality in its semantic structure, as its main meanings form, on the one hand, the “partially emotional” concept of WELL-BEING and, on the other hand, the EC JOY.

Analysis of the data from the study samples revealed a high degree of similarity between the conceptual structures of the ECs HAPPINESS and JOY (85 %). However, the latter differ markedly in the hierarchy of their conceptual organisation, as the speakers of Anglo-Saxon culture associate HAPPINESS primarily with joy, love, and well-being, while JOY is associated with love, happiness, and pride. The organisation of negative ECPs also differs in the conceptual structures of HAPPINESS and JOY, as HAPPINESS contains more meanings that convey suffering and unhappiness, while JOY conveys pain, fear and sorrow. By comparing the mean values of the ECPs of valence and arousal, it was found that the ECPs of HAPPINESS and JOY show a

fairly significant degree of ambivalence. At the same time, HAPPINESS is slightly more positive and intense than JOY.

In general, the results of the proposed work, obtained with the help of a corpus-based methodology based on the quantitative and qualitative study of the ECPs of the studied ECs HAPPINESS and JOY, largely correlate with the results of a number of scientific studies in both cognitive linguistics and psychology, which are devoted to determining the features of these concepts. This fact testifies to a certain objectivity of the methodology tested, which has also made it possible to identify new nuances of the specificity of ECs HAPPINESS and JOY in Anglo-Saxon culture.

References

1. Allen, J. B. (2018) *The psychology of happiness in the modern world: A social psychological approach*. Springer Publishing Company.
2. Altarriba, J., Bauer, L. M., & Benvenuto, C. (1999) Concreteness, context availability, and imageability ratings and word associations for abstract, concrete, and emotion words. *Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers*. 31(4) pp. 578–602. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03200738>
3. Bamberg, M., Ammirati, D., & Shea, S. (1995) What constitutes ‘Good’ data for the study of language development? How children learn to talk about things with noname: ‘double emotions’. In: Davis, P. W. (ed.) *Alternative Linguistics. Descriptive and Theoretical Modes*. Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing, pp. 1–44.
4. Båk, H. (2022) Psychological theories of emotion and their relationship with language. In: Schiewer, G. L., Altarriba, J., & Ng, B. C. (eds.) *Handbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft/Handbooks of linguistics and communication science*. 46(1). Berlin, De Gruyter. pp. 103–146. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110347524-006>
5. Båk, H. & Altarriba, J. (2024) Similar, not universal: the cognitive dimensions of conceptual prototypes of basic emotions in English and in Polish. *Cognition and Emotion*. Advance online publication. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2024.2406347>
6. Barrett, L. F., Mesquita, B., & Gendron, M. (2011) Context in emotion perception. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*. 20(5) pp. 286–290. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411422522>
7. Baş, M. (2024) The conceptual nature of the Turkish emotion term ‘Heyecan’. *Language and Cognition*. 16(3) pp. 666–689. Available at: <https://doi:10.1017/lang-cog.2023.53>
8. Bradley, M. M. & Lang, P. J. (1999) *Affective norms for English words (ANEW): Instruction manual and affective ratings*. Technical Report C-1, The Center for Research in Psychophysiology, University of Florida.

9. CD. Available at: *Cambridge Dictionary*. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/>
10. Cohn, M. A., Fredrickson, B. L., Brown, S. L., Mikels, J. A., & Conway, A. M. (2009) 'Happiness unpacked: Positive emotions increase life satisfaction by building resilience'. *Emotion*. 9(3) pp. 361–368. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015952>
11. Cowen, A., Sauter, D., Tracy, J. L., & Keltner, D. (2019) Mapping the passions: Toward a high-dimensional taxonomy of emotional experience and expression. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*. 20(1) pp. 69–90. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100619850176>
12. Dewaele, J.-M. (2022) 'Research into multilingualism and emotions'. In: Schiewer, G. L., Altarriba, J., & Ng, B. C. (eds.) *Handbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft/Handbooks of linguistics and communication science*. 46(1). Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 1217–1237. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110670851-026>
13. Diener, E., Kesebir, P., & Tov, W. (2009) Happiness. In: Leary, M. R. & Hoyle, R. H (eds.) *Handbook of individual differences in social behavior*. New York, The Guilford Press. pp. 147–160.
14. Emmons, R. A. (2020) Joy: An introduction to this special issue. *The Journal of Positive Psychology*. 15(1) pp. 1–4. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2019.1685580>
15. *English-Corpora.org*. Available at: <https://www.english-corpora.org/>
16. Frijda, N. (2008) The psychologists' point of view. In: Lewis, M., Haviland-Jones, J. M., & Barrett, L. F. (eds.) *Handbook of emotions*. New York, Guilford. pp. 68–87.
17. Foolen, A. (2022) Language and emotion in the history of linguistics. In Schiewer, G. L., Altarriba, J., & Ng, B. C. (eds.) *Handbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft/Handbooks of linguistics and communication science*. 46(1). Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. pp. 31–53. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1075/ceb.6.13foo>
18. Fronhofer, N.-M. (2019) *Emotion Concepts in Context: A Contrastive Analysis of English and German Discourse*, [Doctoral thesis for a doctoral degree, University of Augsburg]. Available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/343308609.pdf>
19. Fugate, J. M. B., Hare, A. J. O., & Emmanuel, W. S. (2018) Emotion words: Facing change. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*. 79 pp. 264–274. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.07.015>
20. Goddard, C. (1998) *Semantic analysis. A practical introduction*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
21. Goldman, A. H. (2017) Happiness is an Emotion. *The Journal of Ethics*. 21(1) pp. 1–16. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45204351>
22. Györi, G. (1998) Cultural variation in the conceptualization of emotions. A historical study'. In: Athanasiadou, A. & Tabakowska, E. (eds.) *Speaking of emotions. Conceptualisation and expression*. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 99–124.
23. Haybron, D. M. (2013) *Happiness*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
24. Hewitt, J. P. (2009) The social construction of self-esteem'. In: Lopez, S. J. & Snyder, C. R. (eds.) *Oxford handbook of positive psychology*. Oxford University Press. pp. 217–224

25. Hildebrand, M. (2014) *Werbewirkung auf Frauen – Beeinflussung des Konsumverhaltens durch emotionale Werbung*, [Bachelorarbeit, Hochschule Mittweida, University of Applied Sciences]. Available at: https://monami.hs-mittweida.de/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/3949/file/Bachelorarbeit_Madlyn_Hildebrand_AM10wS2_B.pdf
26. Jackson, J. C., Watts, J., Henry, T. R., List, J. M., Forkel, R., Mucha, P. J., Greenhill, S. J., Gray, R. D., & Lindquist, K. A. (2019) Emotion semantics show both cultural variation and universal structure. *Science*. 366(6472) pp. 1517–1522. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaw8160>
27. iWeb. *Word Web Corpus*. Available at: <https://www.english-corpora.org/iweb/>
28. Kapranov, O. (2025). A meeting point of culture, royalty, and the environment: Analysing the discourse on sustainability by the Royal Ballet and Opera in London. *Culture. Society. Economy. Politics*. 5(2) pp. 43–59. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2478/csep-2025-0014>
29. Kneer, M. & Haybron, D. (2024) Happiness and well-being: Is it all in your head? Evidence from the folk. *Noûs*. 59(1) pp. 234–268. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4863330>
30. Kollareth, D., Fernandez-Dols, J.-M., & Russell, J. A. (2018) Shame as a culture-specific emotion concept. *Journal of Cognition and Culture*. 18(3-4) pp. 274–292. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12340031>
31. Kövecses, Z. (1990) *Emotion concepts*. New York, Springer. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-3312-1>
32. Kövecses, Z. (2008a) Metaphor and emotion. In: Gibbs, R. W. (ed.) *The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 380–396.
33. Kövecses, Z. (2008b) The Conceptual Structure of Happiness. In: Tissari, H. A., Pessi, B., & Salmela, M. (eds.) *Happiness: Cognition, Experience, Language*. Helsinki, Tutkijakollegium. pp. 131–143.
34. Kövecses, Z. (2020) Emotion concepts in a new light. *Italian journal of philosophy of language: SFL Language and emotions*. pp. 42–54. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.4396/SFL2019I7>
35. Lindquist, K. A. (2017) The role of language in emotion: Existing evidence and future directions. *Current Opinion in Psychology*. 17 pp. 135–139. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.07.006>
36. Lindquist, K. A., Gendron, M., Barrett, L. F., & Dickerson, B. C. (2014) Emotion perception, but not affect perception, is impaired with semantic memory loss. *Emotion*. 14(2) pp. 375–387. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035293>
37. Lomas, T. (2023) The value of ambivalent emotions: A cross-cultural lexical analysis. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*. 20(2) pp. 1–25. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14780887.2017.1400143>
38. Mehrabian, A. & Russell, J. A. (1974) *An approach to environmental psychology*. MIT Press.

39. Mizin, K., Letiucha, L., & Petrov, O. (2019) Deutsche linguokulturelle Konzepte im Lichte der germanisch-ostslawischen Kontraste: Methode zur Feststellung von spezifischen bzw. einzigartigen Bedeutungen. *Germanoslavica*. 30(1) pp. 49–70.
40. Mizin, K. & Petrov, O. (2017) Metaphorical modelling of cognitive structure of the concept STINGINESS in British, German, Ukrainian and Russian linguocultures. *Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski*. VIII(1) pp. 219–226.
41. Mizin, K., Slavova, L., & Petrov, O. (2021) Contrastive Psycholinguistic Study of the British Emotional Concept ENVY and Ukrainian ZAZDRIST: Particularities of Phraseological Objectification. *East European Journal of Psycholinguistics*. 8(2) pp. 170–188. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.29038/ejpl.2021.8.2.miz>
42. Mizin, K. & Slavova, L. (2023) The corpus-based methodology of close emotion concepts differentiation: A case study of ENVY and JEALOUSY. *Cognitive Studies | Études cognitives*. 23 Article 2811. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.11649/cs.2811>
43. Niedenthal, P. M. (2008) Emotion concepts. In: Lewis, M., Haviland-Jones, J. M., & Barrett, L. F. (eds.) *Handbook of emotions*. The Guilford Press. pp. 587–600.
44. Ogarkova, A. (2013) Folk emotion concepts: Lexicalization of emotional experiences across languages and cultures. In: Scherer, K., Fontaine, J., & Soriano, C. (eds.) *Components of emotional meaning: A sourcebook*. Oxford, Oxford University Press. pp. 46–62. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592746.003.0004>
45. Ogarkova, A. (2021) Cross-lingual translatability of emotion terms: A review. In: Meiselman, H. L. (ed.) *Emotion measurement*. Elsevier. pp. 909–935. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-821124-3.00028-4>
46. Ogarkova, A., Borgeaud, P., & Scherer, K. (2009) Language and culture in emotion research: a multidisciplinary perspective. *Social Science Information*. 48(3) pp. 339–357. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018409106196>
47. Ogarkova, A., Panasenko, N., & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, B. (2013) Language family similarity effect: Emotion term semantics in Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Slovak, and Polish. In: Fontaine, J. J. R., Scherer, K. R., & Soriano, C. (eds.) *Components of emotional meaning: A sourcebook*. Oxford University Press. pp. 502–506. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592746.003.0042>
48. Osgood, C. E., May, W. H., & Miron, M. S. (1975) *Cross-cultural universals of affective meaning*. Urbana, University of Illinois Press.
49. Oster, U. (2012) “Angst” and “Fear” in contrast: A corpus-based analysis of emotion concepts. In: Brdar, M., Raffaelli, I., & Žic Fuchs, M. (eds.) *Cognitive linguistics between universality and variation*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 327–355.
50. Panasenko, N. (2013). The role of syntactic stylistic means in expressing the emotion term LOVE. *Research in language*. 11(3) pp. 277–293. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2478/v10015-012-0016-6>
51. Panasenko, N., Stashko, H., & Zabuzhanska, I. (2023). Love and rhythm in poetry and music. In: Lenore Schiewer, G.S., Altarriba, J. & Ng, B.Ch. (eds.) *Language and*

- emotion*. Vol. 3. Berlin, Boston: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 1529–1558. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110795486-009>
52. Plutchik, R. (1997) The circumplex as a general model of the structure of emotions and personality. In: Plutchik, R. & Conte, H. R. (eds.) *Circumplex models of personality and emotions*. American Psychological Association Press. pp. 17–46. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1037/10261-001>
 53. Russell, J. A. (1980) A circumplex model of affect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 39(6) pp. 1161–1178. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0077714>
 54. Russell, J. A. (1989) Culture, scripts and children's understanding of emotion. In: Saarni, C. & Harris, P. L. (eds.) *Children's understanding of emotion*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. pp. 293–318.
 55. Russell, J. A. (2003) 'Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion.' *Psychological review*. 110(1) pp. 145–72. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.110.1.145>
 56. Russell, J. A. (2017) Mixed emotions viewed from the psychological constructionist perspective. *Emotion Review*. 9(2) pp. 111–117. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073916639658>
 57. Russell, J. A. & Barrett, L. F. (1999) Core affect, prototypical emotional episodes, and other things called emotion: Dissecting the elephant. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 76(5) pp. 805–819. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.76.5.805>
 58. Russell, J. & Fehr, B. (1994) Fuzzy concepts in a fuzzy hierarchy: Varieties of anger. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 67(2) pp. 186–205. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.186>
 59. Saarimäki, H., Glerean, E., Smirnov, D., Mynttinen, H., Jääskeläinen, I. P., Sams, M., & Nummenmaa, L. (2022) Classification of emotion categories based on functional connectivity patterns of the human brain. *NeuroImage*. 247 p. 118800. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.118800>
 60. Soriano, C. (2015) Emotion and Conceptual Metaphor. In: Flam, H. & Kleres, J. (eds.) *Methods of Exploring Emotions*. New York & London: Routledge. pp. 206–214.
 61. Soriano, C. & Ogarkova, A. (2025) The meaning of 'frustration' across languages. *Language and Cognition*. 17, e16 pp. 1–21. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2024.50>
 62. Stefanowitsch, A. (2004) Happiness in English and German. A metaphorical pattern analysis. In: Achard, M. & Kemmer, S. (eds.) *Language, Culture and Mind*. Stanford, Stanford University Press. pp. 134–149.
 63. Thomas, E. (2021) Empathetic Failures of Schadenfreude and Glückschmerz in Social Contexts. *Preprint*. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/bgm2n>

64. Tissari, H. (2008) Happiness and Joy in Corpus Contexts: A Cognitive Semantic Analysis. In: Pessi, A. B., Salmela, M., & Tissari, H. (ed.) *Happiness: Cognition, Experience, Language*. Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. pp. 144–174.
65. Trampe, D., Quoidbach, J., & Taquet, M. (2015) Emotions in everyday life. *PLoS ONE*. 10(12) p. e0145450. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0145450>
66. Tsai, J. L. (2007) Ideal affect: Cultural causes and behavioral consequences. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*. 2(3) pp. 242–259. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00043.x>
67. Van Cappellen, P. (2020) The emotion of joy: Commentary on Johnson. *The Journal of Positive Psychology*. 15(1) pp. 40–43. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2019.1685571>
68. Wierzbicka, A. (1992) Defining emotion concepts. *Cognitive Science*. 16(4) pp. 539–581. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog1604_4
69. Wierzbicka, A. (1999) *Emotions Across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521256>
70. Wilson, P. A. & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, B. (2019) Cognitive Structure and Conceptual Clusters of Emotion Terms. *Filozofia i Nauka. Studia filozoficzne i interdyscyplinarne*. 7(1) pp. 91–123. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.37240/FiN.2019.7.2.1.6>

Костантин И. Мизин

Универзитет «Григориј Сковорода», Перејаслав

Катедра за страну филологију, превођење и методiku наставе

Људмила А. Славова

Кијевски национални универзитет «Тарас Шевченко»

Едукативно-наставни институт филологије

Катедра теорије и праксе превођења са енглеског језика

ЕМОЦИОНАЛНИ КОНЦЕПТУАЛНИ ПРОКСИМАТИ КАО КОНСТРУКТОРИ ЗА РАЗГРАНИЧЕЊЕ БЛИСКИХ ЕМОЦИОНАЛНИХ КОНЦЕПАТА: СТУДИЈА СЛУЧАЈА *HAPPINESS И JOY*

Резиме

У чланку су одређени афективни параметри, као и параметри појма према којима се разликују емоционални концепти (ЕК) *HAPPINESS* и *JOY* у англосаксонској култури. Ови параметри издвојени су методом крупне основе која се темељи на појму „емоционални концептуални проксимат” (ЕКП). Аprobација метода предвиђа (1) припрему примера најрелевантнијих ЕКП који представљају (ЕК) *HAPPINESS* и *JOY*, као и

(2) поређење ЕК који се истражују на основу концептуалне структуре и две афективне карактеристике – процена и узбуђење. Потврђено је да концептуална структура ЕК HAPPINESS за разлику од JOY није представљена само емоционалним смислом, већ такође и споредним стањима – расположењем и темпераментом. HAPPINESS представља двојни смисао у структури, зато што су основни појмови формирано као делимично емоционални концепт WELL-BEING, али и ЕК JOY.

Анализом примера у истраживању смо успели одредити да без обзира на високи показатељ сличности концептуалних структура ЕК HAPPINESS и JOY, они се приметно разликују по хијерархији своје концептуалне структуре, будући да код носилаца англосаксонске културе HAPPINESS првенствено асоцира радост, љубав и благостање, док JOY асоцира љубав, срећу и понос. Осим тога, постоји и разлика у негативним ЕКП концептуалних структура HAPPINESS и JOY, зато што HAPPINESS садржи више значења која преносе патњу и несрећу, док су код JOY значења бола, страха, туге. Путем поређења средњих показатеља оцена и узбуђења ЕКП концепата HAPPINESS и JOY установљено је да ЕК показују значајан показатељ амбиваленције. Притом, HAPPINESS има нешто позитивније и интензивније значење него JOY.

► *Кључне ријечи:* емоционалан концептуални проксимат, емоционални концепт, радост, срећа, семантика, корпусна лингвистика.